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In spite of the occasional give and take, agreements 
and temporary advantages for some, the present bal-
ance of power and the deterrent effect of the debt 
trap in which the Latin American countries are con-
fined involve extremely high costs for them. Neverthe-
less, the unpasses which are the consequence of con-
tinuing to pull on a rope which is strangling all of us 
correspond to a powerful logic which it is extremely 
difficult to break and replace with another more com-
patible with the essential interests of our countries. 
T h e author maintains, however, that this is not im-
possible: a prerequisite for achieving it involves facing 
up to the situation in which we find ourselves, as well as 
to the logic behind it and the strategies which derive 
from k for debtors and creditors. All the rest could 
depend on nothing more than the vision and audacity 
of our countries' political leadership and their capac-
ity to set out the real choices before their people, as 
well as the costs and risks involved in each of them. It is 
a highly significant fact that in the present extremely 
harsh economic and social crisis most political lead-
erships, be they in government or in the opposition, 
a re democratic. Among other things this provides a 
hitherto inexistent capacity for dialogue. Such a dia-
logue, based on the patriotic and carefully considered 
search for a way out of the dilemma in which we are all 
trapped, would represent an important first step. 
•Senior Researcher of CEBRAP. Academic Director of the 
Kellogg Institute of the University of Notre Dame, and UNDP 
consultant. 
I 
Where do we stand? 
"Unity is strength." Although this proverb does 
not always prove to be true, it has always pro-
vided the underlying motive for the weak to band 
together, so as to at least make up for their weak-
ness. The same is true today of debtor countries. 
Common sense dictates two reasons. First of all, 
presenting a common front to creditors would 
increase the bargaining capacity of each and ev-
ery one of the debtors. Secondly, the creditors 
are well organized: they have formed their own 
"club" or "cartel", run by Committees managed 
by the major banks, they have their "general sec-
retariat" and means of exerting pressure on the 
debtors in the form of the International Mone-
tary Fund, and they can rely on determined sup-
port from their governments. 
However, the much talked-of alliance be-
tween debtors, in which some of our gov-
ernments placed high hopes when they assumed 
office, seems a long way off. In order to un-
derstand this, and to think out new possibilities, it 
may be useful to call on some elements which 
have been developed by political science in the 
field of game theory and coalitions. It should be 
mentioned in passing that there is every reason to 
believe that these elements are known and used 
by the creditors. 
Let us start with the fact that what we are 
dealing with is a negotiation in which it is in our 
interest to pay as little as possible, over the long-
est possible period and with the smallest possible 
effects on the economic growth of our countries. 
Any negotiation involves agreements, and also 
more or less explicit threats as to what one of the 
parties could do against the interests of the other. 
Just as in poker, there is always an element of 
bluff; but in the long term it is impossible to win if 
one always holds the losing cards. In other words, 
in addition to a considerable element of skill and 
audacity, any negotiation takes place within the 
context of a balance of power. 
If we assume that, whatever else may be 
claimed, debtors are in a weaker position than 
creditors, and the latter are organized while the 
former are disunited, there can be little doubt 
as to the outcome of negotiations on the external 
debt. Fortunately, however, it is not a question of 
just one negotiation whose effects will be felt for 
28 CEPAL REVIEW No. 27 / December 1985 
ever, but rather (partly as a result of the ex-
orbitant consequences for debtors of the balance 
of power affecting them) an ongoing process or 
series of renegotiations as to how and when the 
external debt is to be paid. 
Within this process it is clearly in the credi-
tors' interest to avoid modifications in the relative 
strength of the parties involved —i.e., to prevent 
the debtors from organizing themselves. In 
order to achieve this the creditors can take, and 
have taken, a number of steps. First of all, they 
can loudly protest against any attempts to 
organize "clubs" of debtors, quite naturally with-
out being bothered (since it is not a question of 
logic but of power) by the incongruency of such 
protests in view of their own high degree of 
organization. Secondly, they can insist that it is a 
purely "technical" and "economic" question, as if 
it were "merely" a contract under private law 
—thus ruling out the "politicization" which 
would be implied by the debtors joining together 
in their capacity of national States with unavoid-
able responsibilities towards their populations. 
Thirdly, they may threaten to impose harsh sanc-
tions on debtors who break the rules of the game 
by failing to pay or attempting to unilaterally 
redefine the terms of repayment. 
All this is so obvious that, if we consider it in 
this light, it is most surprising that debtors have 
not yet set up their own alliance. Far less obvious, 
however, are the mechanisms through which the 
creditors are managing to prevent such an 
alliance from coming into being. The reasons 
correspond to the strict logic of game theory. 
What is involved is, firstly, the plausibility of the 
threats made by each side, and secondly the cost-
benefit calculation made by each player regard-
ing himself and his opponent, assuming that any 
of the threats is carried out. The most serious 
threat which the debtor can make is quite simply 
not to pay. The greatest threat which the creditor 
is capable of making, for his part, is to exclude 
the debtor from the "international community" : 
to cut off import credits, ban exports by the de-
btor, and confiscate his property in other coun-
tries, among other sanctions. Carrying out this 
threat would involve the creditors in costs: not 
only would they cease to collect the amounts 
claimed but they would also suffer a loss of prof-
its and earnings through ceasing to do business 
with this debtor; in addition, if the conflict 
reached this extreme, it is quite likely that the 
debtor would confiscate the creditor's goods in 
his territory. 
The problem revolves around the "dis-
suasive relationship" which tends to confine the 
debtor within the present balance of power. It is 
in this respect that the problem of the debtor's 
isolation is important, since if instead of simply 
not paying or unilaterally rescheduling his pay-
ments, he managed to form an alliance with others 
in a similar situation, this relationship would 
change radically. If the government of country X 
decides unilaterally not to pay or to redefine the 
way in which it would be prepared to pay, it is 
obliged with regard to its own population (at least 
if it is a democratic government) to first of all 
foresee which of the harsh sanctions mentioned 
earlier will be applied and, secondly, to explain 
these consequences to the population and in 
some way consult it. This holds true for ex-
tremely practical reasons: if the sanctions are 
applied and lead to serious economic shortages, 
and if (as must be expected) these sanctions and 
shortages considerably radicalize the domestic 
political process, the government could not fail to 
ignore, in the calculations made before taking 
that decision, the consequences which are ex-
tremely likely to follow: the social and economic 
upheavals which the sanctions would produce 
would, in spite of the foreseeable initial eu-
phoria, imply its political suicide or set off a rev-
olutionary process. None of the present Latin 
American governments show any such suicidal 
or revolutionary vocation, especially as these up-
heavals would come on top of the serious crises 
which our countries are already experiencing. In 
the face of such likelihoods it is quite reasonable 
for these governments to conclude that it is less 
costly to continue renegotiating, even from a 
position of extreme weakness, than to precipitate 
a rupture with creditors. I fear that the creditors 
are fully aware of this: in other words, the great-
est threat which the debtors are capable of mak-
ing is not plausible and, consequently, is of no use 
as a lever in negotiations. 
On the other hand, is the threat of sanctions 
made by creditors plausible? It certainly is, and 
herein lies the fundamental disparity which re-
flects the existing balance of power. If country X 
ceases to pay, the creditors must weigh up the 
cost to them of applying these sanctions against 
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the cost of not doing so. In the calculation which 
the creditors must make, they must take account 
of all the debt owed by all debtors: if country X 
gets away with not paying (or unilaterally 
rescheduling), it considerably increases the likeli-
hood of other debtors doing the same. In other 
words, however large the debt owed by country X 
may be and however high the cost of isolating it 
economically, this would be less than the losses 
suffered by the creditors if other countries took 
similar decisions. Furthermore, it would be in the 
creditors' interest not merely to apply sanctions 
to X but to apply the severest possible sanctions, 
so that X suffers the gravest possible con-
sequences, since the graver they are, the more 
efficient they will prove in dissuading others 
from following suit. Thus, debtors cannot fail to 
be aware that it is probable that creditors really 
do hold the trump card they claim is in their 
hand. As we have seen, the same is not true of 
each debtor in isolation. 
However, the costs and benefits to creditors 
involved in the dissuasive relationship would be 
changed if not just X but X...N countries jointly 
threatened to cease to pay or to unilaterally re-
schedule their payments. Since this joining of 
forces increases the debt involved, as well as the 
loss of profits and earnings which would affect 
creditors if they cut off relations with these 
countries, it also increases the cost of sanctioning 
them as against the benefits gained in the sense of 
dissuading the remaining countries. A fun-
damental change occurs in the balance of power 
at the point where both curves intersect: it be-
comes plausible that these debtors as a group 
—but, I insist, only as a group— really possess 
and may manage to play their highest card. 
In the face of such a situation, game theory 
indicates that the principal target of the strategy 
pursued by rationally motivated creditors would 
not be —as is generally assumed— to continually 
optimize their capacity to obtain payments from 
the debtors. Instead, the principal target (or, at 
least, the limitation to which such an optimization 
is subject) would be to maintain the dissuasive 
relationship and, with it, the balance of power on 
which it is grounded. As we shall see, awareness 
of this fact may have considerable practical con-
sequences. 
In order to reach their goal, the creditors 
must meet two conditions. The first is related to 
themselves, and concerns their own organization 
in a club or cartel. It is crucial that they exercise 
self-discipline, ensuring that no single one of 
them attempts to optimize its short-term debt 
collection position, or —which amounts to the 
same thing— ensuring that the dominant con-
cern not to cause a change in the dissuasive 
relationship remains paramount in the relation-
ship with debtors. It is no accident that the Com-
mittees which deal with each of the debtor 
countries are directed by the main creditor 
banks, and that the IMF plays a pivotal role: both 
are virtually obliged to take a medium and long-
term view, in contrast with small creditors whose 
credit involves a small part of their wealth. If this 
were not so, pressure from the latter could lead a 
large enough number of debtors to such a degree 
of despair that they might be prepared to pay any 
price in order to avoid paying. It should be 
pointed out, in addition, that by acting con-
certedly and thus maximizing their capacity to 
exert pressure to maintain the existing balance of 
power, the creditor banks and other sectors of 
transnational capital are able to considerably in-
crease their profits in activities which are 
apparently unconnected with the external debt. 
This is the consequence of their capacity to put 
heavy pressure on the debtor governments to 
consent, for example, to give such transnational 
capital access to domestic markets or activities 
which these governments would not otherwise 
have authorized. This is the "good behaviour" 
pledge which creditors demand in order to 
accept postponements of debt payments which in 
any case, as we have seen, it is not in their best 
interest to maximize in the short term. Con-
sequently, our countries are probably paying a 
heavy tribute whose origin in fact lies in the ex-
ternal debt, but which, as this relationship is 
obscure, is not attributed to the debt and con-
sequently does not subject creditors to the risk 
that the balance of power from which this very 
same tribute originates will be questioned. 
As far as the debtors are concerned, the in-
terests of the creditors make it necessary that 
they be kept in the so-called "debt trap", whose 
structure I shall set out below, in so far as it 
directly concerns our subject. To begin with, it 
must be pointed out that in view of the serious 
damage which would be caused to them by the 
formation of a sufficiently "weighty" alliance of 
debtors capable of intersecting the above-
mentioned cost/benefit calculation, it is rational 
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for creditors to be prepared to make relatively 
high "payments" to certain debtors to prevent 
the formation of such an alliance. From the point 
of view of the debtors, these are known as "side 
payments": individual benefits which some 
countries receive as compensation for acting in 
accordance with the strategy of the creditors —in 
other words, bribes not to act in accordance with 
the interests of the debtors as a group. 
To sum up, from the creditor's point of view 
it is rational to make side payments to prevent an 
alliance of debtors. This is even more true as, in 
general, it is not real payments that are involved 
but rather agreements to postpone the recovery 
of sums which the creditors are fully aware it 
would be extremely difficult to collect at term 
and which, if they attempted to do so, might 
provoke desperate debtors into running the risk 
of forming their alliance. As far as each debtor is 
concerned (or, more precisely, the government 
of each debtor), we have seen that the maximum 
threat of not paying or of unilaterally reschedul-
ing the debt is highly implausible. However, a 
debtor can make another threat: that of helping 
to form a debtors' "club". For this threat in turn 
to be plausible, the debtor must satisfy the follow-
ing conditions: a) he must join with other debtors 
who as a group are important enough to in-
tersect the cost/benefit curve drawn by the credi-
tors, since it is beyond this point of intersection 
that it would no longer be rational for the latter 
to act with maximum severity towards these 
debtors; b) he must be fully confident that these 
other debtors will follow him down the same 
path; and c) he must have given clear indications 
(although not necessarily public ones) that he is 
serious in his intention and that other debtors 
may respond to it. 
Behind these statements there are a number 
of problems of which the creditors may take 
advantage. The first of these is that it is rational 
to offer side payments to precisely those debtors 
who seem to be moving towards an alliance (such 
payments need not be made to all of them; it is 
sufficient to offer them to a large enough num-
ber so that the importance of the alliance will be 
reduced). Each of these debtors sees the situation 
as follows: if it accepts these payments it will be in 
a better position than before it seemed prepared 
to promote or to take part in the alliance of debt-
ors; in other words, the plausibility of this 
threat proved, or was from the beginning, an 
excellent tool in negotiation. However, the price 
paid is the persistence of the balance of power 
and consequently of the dissuasive relationship 
which existed before. Moreover, the debtor must 
weigh the immediate and tangible advantages of 
receiving side payments against the medium-
term benefits of forming the alliance, and the net 
balance of these benefits will depend upon some-
thing which it is not possible to foresee in full 
—the reactions of the creditors. 
If, on the contrary, the debtor rejects the side 
payment and remains firm in his intentions, he 
cannot fail to be aware that the tactic followed by 
the creditors will be to offer side payments to 
other debtors. Moreover, the nearer the debtor 
came to achieving his goal, the bigger those pay-
ments would be. As these payments could be-
come quite important for some debtors, none of 
them could be sure, right up to the last moment, 
that he would be able to form a sufficiently 
powerful alliance. If desertions took place, those 
debtors who remained linked to too weak an 
alliance would suffer the serious sanctions men-
tioned at the beginning, leaving them in the 
worst possible position. As far as the deserters are 
concerned, their situation would have improved 
but, as already pointed out, at the cost of ratifying 
a balance of power which is extremely unfavour-
able to them. In relation to the external debt, this 
is the "debt trap" in which we find ourselves and 
in which it is the best interests of the creditors to 
keep us. 
It is impossible for this dilemma to be broken 
by means of sequential decisions: if country X 
"sticks its head out" in the hope that Y and Z will 
follow to form a sufficiently strong alliance, it 
must be aware that in this case, the side payments 
which creditors are prepared to make to Y and Z 
would increase even more. In this case, X could 
be leaping into the abyss to no effect but to force 
up the side payments received by the deserters; 
the repeated, and unsuccessful exhortations 
along the lines of "we're all in this together, but 
you go first" reflect this situation. Game theory 
confirms that the knot can only be severed firstly 
by setting up extremely reliable communications 
between the potential members of the club, and 
secondly, by all of the members taking a si-
multaneous decision. In the second part of this 
paper we shall see whether this path is capable of 
leading us to somewhat more encouraging con-
clusions. 
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II 
Can anything be done? 
In the first part of this paper we saw that as far as 
the external debt is concerned, our countries are 
in a "debt trap", and that the predominant 
strategy of the creditors is, quite rationally, to 
keep us in this dilemma. We also saw that if there 
is any way out, it is to be found through setting up 
convincing communications between debtors, in 
order to simultaneously announce and formalize 
their alliance and the principal decisions which it 
has taken with regard to their debt. In order to 
explore this path it is worthwhile pursuing the 
development of a remark made in the first part 
of this paper. Given the serious damage which 
would be caused to creditors by the formation of 
a sufficiently important alliance for it to be too 
costly to apply harsh sanctions against all its 
members, the side payments which creditors are 
prepared to make in order to prevent such a 
joining of forces grow rapidly the more probable 
and imminent the formation of such an alliance 
seems. 
Apart from the fact that it is always possible 
that someone will "betray" his fellows at the last 
moment and leave them in an insufficiently 
powerful alliance, this raises the problem of the 
process by which the alliance could be formal-
ized. If, for example, the governments of coun-
tries X ... N agreed to jointly declare a five-year 
moratorium and then to repay the debt over 
periods and at rates of interest which they also 
jointly decide without the prior agreement of the 
creditors, it is clearly in their interest for the 
negotiations between them, as well as the domes-
tic preparatory work done by each of them, to be 
carried out in the strictest secrecy. If the creditors 
learn of these steps they are likely to redouble 
their efforts to attract deserters, as well as to 
mobilize domestic sectors in each debtor country 
which, for a variety of reasons, might oppose this 
alliance. It must also be foreseen that the credi-
tors and their governments would apply a num-
ber of "preventive sanctions" to dissuade the 
debtors. This all implies that —above all if it is 
revealed— the process of forming the alliance 
would be far from free of political and economic 
costs. However, if we consider that the negotia-
tions will require journeys and international 
communications involving important personali-
ties from the debtor countries, we see that it is 
unlikely that this process will remain unnoticed 
by the intelligence services of the creditor coun-
tries. Furthermore —and above all— the secrecy 
of the negotiations and the consequent inevitable 
lack of any consultation over a decision such as 
the formation of an alliance of debtors, which 
cannot fail to involve considerable risks and un-
certainty (and possibly costs) for the population, 
would hardly be in line with the democratic na-
ture of many of the governments which could 
form such an alliance in Latin America. 
This raises the problem of how the repre-
sentatives of each of these governments could 
assure the others that they are fully authorized to 
bind their government (and country) in the 
alliance; failing this, each of them would tend to 
decide that the risk of desertion is too great, and 
this in itself increases this risk. Could ministers of 
the economy or of foreign affairs claim this au-
thority? Obviously not, as they may be dismissed 
or disavowed tomorrow. What about the pres-
idents? The present presidents of our countries 
could hardly be expected to feel they possess 
such Ceasar-like duties and powers as to assume 
these responsibilities alone. What about parlia-
ment, which is the body that initiates legislation 
or ratifies presidential initiatives? This would be 
closer to the spirit and the letter of constitutional 
democracy, but it would be difficult, if not to 
forecast the result of parliamentary decisions, at 
least to ensure the essential simultaneity of de-
cisions in all the countries which would make up 
the "Club". What about a popular referendum? 
This would probably be the most appropriate 
means (if there are no constitutional im-
pediments to this, as there are in certain coun-
tries), particularly as it could be held simul-
taneously in all the countries. It must be 
pointed out, however, that the most suitable 
arrangements for taking such a great decision 
(some combination of presidential and par-
liamentary authority, perhaps together with a 
referendum) take a considerable length of time 
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to implement. This heightens the vulnerability to 
attempts at bribery and various other forms of 
pressure from the creditors, especially if we con-
sider that, as we have seen, each government 
begins to incur considerable costs for itself and 
for its country from the moment it starts on this 
decision process, before having any assurance 
that the alliance will come into existence. If for 
any reason whatsoever it became necessary to 
back down (for example, because some countries 
which were essential to the alliance had deserted 
during this period), those costs would have been 
incurred in vain: they would have served merely 
to sharpen domestic conflicts, demoralize those 
who supported the governments in question, and 
benefit the deserter countries through the high 
side payments they would receive in this case. 
Naturally, this risk is lower in the case of secret 
negotiations whose results are announced un-
expectedly —but we have already seen that it is 
unlikely that they could be hidden from the cred-
itors and, in addition, such secrecy is hard to 
reconcile with the operation of a democratic 
régime. 
These are not the only hurdles which would 
have to be overcome. Supposing this "club" or 
debtors' alliance came into being, it is necessary 
to start from the assumption that it would be 
subject to the centrifugal forces characteristic of 
any cartel or oligopoly. In order to reach the 
desired goals it is far from sufficient to simply 
create the alliance. It is equally important that the 
alliance should hold together for the whole of the 
period involved in the decision to declare a mora-
torium and the subsequent rescheduling of ex-
ternal debt payments (which must of necessity 
cover a relatively long period, if this alliance is to 
have any significance for the debtors). To come 
back to the first part of this paper, let us consider 
the most favourable hypothesis. A number N of 
debtor countries have managed to form an 
alliance of such weight that, as they have correct-
ly calculated, the creditors (including the IMF and 
its member governments) consider that even 
though this alliance may cause them extremely 
serious damage, the costs they themselves would 
have to bear as a result of applying the harshest 
sanctions to these debtors (and which, as we have 
seen, the creditors would probably not hesitate 
to apply if that alliance were not sufficiently 
weighty) would be even greater. 
In other words, by means of their alliance the 
debtors would have managed to escape from the 
debt trap. However, for this very same reason, 
the rational tactic for the creditors to follow 
would be to attempt to return them to the trap. 
They would possess an important capacity for 
doing this, so that it is highly likely that, although 
they might not make maximum use of their re-
prisal capacity, they would not fail to apply cer-
tain sanctions to these countries. These sanctions 
would have differential consequences for the 
debtor countries, depending on their economic 
structure, degree and type of industrialization 
and the characteristics of their principal exports, 
among other factors. In addition, depending 
upon the balance of political and ideological 
forces in each country, such consequences could 
be differently interpreted and evaluated. Further-
more, it would be rational for the creditors to 
attempt to accentuate these differences as far as 
possible; they would thus be able to develop feel-
ings of injustice regarding the consequences of 
the alliance between the member countries. 
Following this, the creditors would again aim, 
although in a less favourable context than at the 
present time, to foment sufficient desertions of 
member countries to ensure that the alliance was 
no longer sufficiently important. If they man-
aged to do so, the situation would return to what 
it was before, although probably with even high-
er costs for those debtors who remained within 
an insufficiently weighty alliance. 
A typical way of diminishing the above-
mentioned risk (but not of eliminating it) is for 
the "members" to become hostages of each other, 
so to speak. This could be done, for example, by 
setting up a supranational body to which they 
would transfer, for the period required by the 
moratorium and the subsequent payment plan, 
the decision-making power and the resources 
necessary for the alliance to function. This is the 
point where creative thinking, in which special-
ists from various disciplines would have to par-
ticipate, could make its principal contribution. In 
addition, it would be essential to do this right 
now, as the prospect of a viable institutional sys-
tem which is in principle acceptable to the poten-
tial "members" would undoubtedly give a strong 
impetus in this direction. 
Strictly speaking, however, the preceding 
two paragraphs go beyond the limits of what it is 
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reasonable to propose, according to the lines of 
game and coalition theories. If an important 
enough coalition came into being and if this at 
least gave the impression of being capable of 
lasting over the medium term, it would enor-
mously increase the number of variables which 
would have to be taken into account. In particu-
lar, it would be highly likely that other debtor 
countries which did not initially belong to the 
alliance would wish to join it, or that they would 
unilaterally declare their adherence to the con-
ditions of the moratorium and the payment plan 
set up by the alliance (since it would no longer be 
rational for creditors to severely sanction debtors 
taking a unilateral decision after the creation of 
that alliance). The convergence of these inter-
lopers with the original members of the alliance 
would so deeply transform at least the set of 
international financial relations involved that the 
game in which the parties were engaged would 
no longer be the same as that outlined in this 
paper. 
